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 Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional
 Economics
 by
 Victor P. Goldberg
 One significant division that emerged during the conference involved the role
 of risk aversion in analyzing institutional arrangements. I, along with Oliver
 Williamson, took the position that the risk aversion assumption deflects atten-
 tion from the more significant determinants and that more progress would be
 made if we could bind our hands and agree to invoke attitudes toward risk only
 as a last resort.1 Professor Richter has graciously given me this opportunity to
 elaborate upon this theme.
 Risk aversion is a conversation-stopper. I mean this in two senses. First, for
 people with mono-causal world views, one explanation is enough. It is not
 fanciful, I think, to identify a standard research strategy. When confronting
 some stylized institutional fact (e.g., hedging in futures markets, commission
 pricing, sharecropping, indexation of prices) invoke risk aversion.2 If that
 appears consistent with the facts, stop the search. This strategy is not a neces-
 sary consequence of the assumption of risk aversion, but the pattern seems,
 from an informal reading of the evidence, to be a strong one. Deprived of the
 risk-aversion short cut, the analyst would be forced to pursue other, and, I
 believe richer, lines of thought. Which leads to my second point: modelling
 entails opportunity costs. If risk aversion is to be included, then we have to
 simplify the world in other ways in order to build tractable models or otherwise
 make some sense of a complicated reality. If we assume that people are more
 or less risk neutral, then we can focus on the sorts of questions that I think are
 important in understanding economic institutions. If we insist on including risk
 preferences in the model, then these other considerations must be put aside.
 A common retort to the no-risk-aversion position is: But don't you believe
 that people really are risk averse?3 The ad hominem variant on this theme is:
 1 See Williamson [1985, 388-389], Klein [1983, 370] and Barzel [1982] have taken
 a similar position.
 2 See Wiliamson's [1985, 389] discussion of Townsend's [1982] analysis of multi-peri-
 od contracts. In Townsend's model there would be no multi-period contracts but for
 differential risk aversion.
 3 I suspect that much of the intuitive appeal of risk aversion to non-economists
 (notably law professors) derives from a misconception about its definition. Risk aversion
 for them means that people are averse to downside risk.
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 Well, do you buy insurance? There are a number of responses to these argu-
 ments. The first, and probably least important, is that the evidence from the
 cognitive psychologists suggests that risk aversion does not adequately describe
 behavior.4 But that observation is largely beside the point. Even if everybody
 were risk averse it might still be appropriate to assume risk neutrality. To make
 any headway in theorizing we must simplify reality and assume things known
 to be false.
 I am bewildered by economists who make the "people really are risk averse"
 argument and at the same time make wildly unrealistic assumptions about the
 ability of individuals to make complex calculations and engage in long chains
 of sophisticated reasoning. The evidence on risk aversion is at least mixed. The
 evidence regarding people's reasoning skills we see every day and it is pretty
 clear that most people can't handle tenthgrade word problems, let alone some
 of the sophisticated mental feats routinely assigned to them by economic theo-
 rists. My point is not that the unrealistic assumptions negate the conclusions.
 It is simply that the assumption regarding risk preferences should, like the
 assumptions regarding computational skills, be judged for their usefulness, not
 for their realism.
 The question about the purchase of insurance, alluded to above, had an
 implied premise : people buy insurance because (and only because) they are risk
 averse. This is a good example of how the risk-aversion assumption stifles
 inquiry. There are numerous reasons why parties might buy insurance even if
 they are not risk averse. An interesting array of problems and solutions awaits
 the analyst willing to go beyond the limits imposed by a risk-aversion based
 research strategy.5
 Why might a large corporation with publicly traded shares buy various lines
 of casualty insurance? One might try to attack the problem by assuming that
 managers are risk averse and that the behavior of the firm in this dimension
 reflects the manager's preferences. I doubt that this line of argument will work.
 It implies that corporations which self-insure for the same problems act as if
 they are not risk averse. I suspect that it would require some elaborate intellec-
 tual contortions to develop a plausible argument as to why some corporations
 act as if they are risk averse and others risk neutral.6
 4 See the papers reproduced in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky [1982].
 5 Another obvious area in which it is easy to stop at risk aversion as the explanation
 is the nature and function of futures markets. For examples of thoughtful analysts who
 have found risk aversion unhelpful in understanding futures markets, see Working
 [1962], Telser [1981], and Williams [1986].
 6 A more natural framework for analyzing self-insurance is given below. The risk
 aversion argument can be salvaged by arguing that the firm would want to purchase
 insurance but for the usual panoply of insurance problems - adverse selection, moral
 hazard, erroneous classifications, etc. That is, the firm would buy actuarially fair in-
 surance, but not the insurance actually offered to it.
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 It seems to me far more helpful to suppress the question of attitudes toward
 risk and focus on why a risk neutral corporation might buy insurance. Perhaps
 the most interesting reason is that the insurance company is a specialist
 provider of risk management services.7 (See Goldberg [1980] and Mayers and
 Smith [1982]). The insurance company provides services (for example, inspec-
 tion) to reduce the firm's expected accident costs (including the costs of litiga-
 tion and rehabilitation of victims). Since it is difficult to determine how well an
 inspector has performed the promised service, it is plausible that the inspection
 contract would make compensation contingent upon performance. That is, an
 efficient inspection contract might include déductibles, copayments, and ceil-
 ings - standard features of insurance contracts. (I suspect, by the way, that it
 would be difficult to reconcile liability ceilings with a risk-aversion explana-
 tion.) The share of the premium dollar going to inspection services varies
 considerably over different lines of insurance. For some it is undeniably impor-
 tant, with over twenty percent of the premium for some lines of insurance
 (steam boiler and elevator insurance, for example) going to inspection services.8
 The existence of self-insurance can be treated more naturally when the prob-
 lem is viewed in this light. Instead of focusing on the relative risk aversion of
 organizations, the focus is on whether a firm should perform its risk manage-
 ment activities internally, or whether it should purchase some, or all, of them
 from an external provider. This is a standard make-versus-buy question that
 would confront the corporation regardless of whether it was risk averse, risk
 neutral, risk loving, or had some even more complicated preferences regarding
 risk.
 What is the effect of insurance on a corporation's accident costs? A risk-aver-
 sion framework suggests that costs will remain the same (the risks are exoge-
 nous) or increase (moral hazard results in less accident avoidance by the corpo-
 rations). My framework suggests that insurance could easily result in a decrease
 in accident costs if the external provider of risk management services is a more
 efficient provider than the self-insuring corporation. Thus, if public policy
 resulted in an increase in the costs of commercial insurance relative to self-in-
 surance, my framework would suggest that it is plausible that accident costs
 would rise - a result that could not be derived from the risk-aversion approach.
 Let me suggest another puzzle regarding insurance. When one buys a house
 (at least in the United States) one typically buys title insurance and property
 insurance. This seems consistent with risk aversion since the house is typically
 a very large element in the buyer's portfolio. The puzzle involves the fact that
 the lender usually conditions the loan upon the buyer's purchase of the in-
 surance. This seems peculiar if risk aversion is the driving force. Is the bank
 7 Interestingly, shortly after the conference while touring the London Museum, I
 happened upon an exhibit concerning the development of fire insurance following the
 great fire of 1 666. The insurers all had their own fire companies and, in effect, provided
 protection services to their customers, bearing the costs when the protection failed.
 8 See Goldberg [1980, 72-73].
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 more risk averse than the buyer? That can't be right. Is the bank just doing the
 buyer a favor, reminding him of something he would have done anyway had
 he bothered to think about it? I doubt that many economists would find great
 comfort pursuing that line of explanation. If we ask instead why a risk-neutral
 bank would require title and property insurance, then we can get some insights.
 The title insurance question is relatively easy. The probability of an "accident"
 (faulty title) depends upon the level of care in conducting the title search. The
 bank, in effect, hires a specialist to research the title. The search contract
 provides that, in the event that the searcher erred, it will compensate the bank
 for losses arising from the error. My impression is that only a very small
 percentage of the premium for title insurance is paid out to those with a flawed
 title. The vast bulk of the revenues cover the provision of the loss-reducing
 service.
 I am somewhat less confident about the bank's interest in property insurance,
 but I can suggest a plausible line of inquiry. The bank is exposed to moral
 hazard on the part of the borrower. The bank bears the bulk of the losses from
 the destruction of an uninsured borrower's house and has no effective control
 over what the user does with the house. Moreover, it would be extremely
 difficult for the bank to set (and readjust) a price for bearing the exposure to
 these losses over time. An independent firm, the insurance company, that has
 a mechanism in place for pricing the exposure and has some tools for inducing
 the home owner/borrower to take greater care (for example, a reduced premi-
 um if the owner installs smoke alarms) can, plausibly, perform this task more
 efficiently than can the lender. I don't claim that this is a fully satisfactory
 resolution of the problem.9 My point is a more modest one. The existence of
 the problem itself is obscured when we observe the world through risk-aversion
 tinted glasses.
 One of the issues that stimulated the discussion of risk aversion at the
 conference was Professor Varian's [1989] analysis of tax farming. He analyzed
 the problem in terms of a risk-averse government hiring a risk-neutral tax
 farmer to collect taxes from risk-averse taxpayers. I argued that tax farming
 was just a special case of a more general problem: the collection of debts. The
 creditor (whether it is a private firm or the government) has to decide whether
 particular debts should be collected by employees or by specialist outsiders.
 Further, it has to decide whether the collector should be compensated with
 wages, a sharing rule, a fixed fee, or some other compensation scheme. Profes-
 sor Varian demonstrated that a particular configuration of risk preferences
 would result in a specific outcome in which the collector paid a fixed fee to the
 creditor (the state) for the privilege of collecting the debt (taxes). My primary
 9 Friedman [1973, § 9.7] notes that mortgages for commercial landlords often include
 covenants requiring that the landlord maintain fire insurance and that similar terms are
 often included in its leases. He suggests that this is "to assure the tenant that the landlord
 will have funds to pay for restoration."
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 complaint was that the invocation of attitudes toward risk hides everything of
 interest. Why, for example, would a firm sell outright some subset of its ac-
 counts receivable and not others? Is it risk averse over some of its business
 activities, but not others? Is that even a coherent question? Once again, it
 strikes me as much more instructive to suppress risk attitudes and to focus
 instead on the other determinants of whether the collection should be vertically
 integrated and the manner in which the collectors are compensated.
 Following the conference Professor Varian and I had an illuminating discus-
 sion of a specific problem. Large automobile manufacturers like General Mo-
 tors commonly enter into supply contracts with parts suppliers in which the
 supplier bears all the risks of demand fluctuations. Some non-economists argue
 that this is an instance of a large firm using its power to shift costs to a smaller
 firm. There are two problems with this argument. First, if the large firm does
 indeed have power vis à vis the smaller firm, there is no a priori reason that the
 power should be exercised in this dimension. It could, for example, simply force
 the supplier to sell at a lower price. Thus, to complete the argument it is
 necessary to show that exercising the power in this particular way results in
 greater profits than had it been exercised otherwise. Second, if all that is
 involved is the shifting of an exogenous risk, why would rational parties choose
 to shift the risk from a large firm to a small firm? If firms are characterized by
 risk attitudes, it would seem extraordinarily odd to find that huge General
 Motors is more risk averse than its much smaller suppliers. It makes no sense
 for General Motors to pay someone to bear the risks when it could do so at a
 lower cost. A theory driven by risk aversion should predict that General Motors
 would bear the losses.
 Why then does the contract shift the risks from General Motors to its
 suppliers? It is easiest to attack this problem by first assuming a risk-neutral
 automobile manufacturer, vertically integrated into supplying a particular part.
 It faces an inventory problem. How much capacity for part production should
 it maintain to meet the expected demand? Determination of the optimal inven-
 tory is a fairly routine business decision for the integrated firm. Its decision
 depends on the relative costs of error and the loss function is asymmetric. Other
 things equal, the inventory should be greater the greater the costs of having an
 inadequate stock on hand and the lower the costs of maintaining an inventory
 that was too large. Since the entire production line might have to be shut down
 if there is a shortfall of a particular part, the costs of the inventory being too
 low can be considerable.
 If the part is to be provided by an independent firm, the parties face the same
 inventory problem and they face the additional problem of coordinating their
 decisions across organizational boundaries. A plausible way to achieve this
 coordination would be for General Motors to compensate (directly or indirect-
 ly) the supplier for holding a large inventory of parts or productive capacity
 while keeping the quantity decision in General Motors' hands. That, in effect,
 is what the supply contracts provide for.
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 Professor VariarTs response to this argument was to accept it and to argue
 that General Motor's vulnerability to having an inadequate inventory of parts
 could be characterized as General Motors being more risk averse than its
 supplier in this context. Risk aversion, in this interpretation, is not a matter of
 attitude toward risk. It is a description of the curvature of a utility function. The
 mathematics does not depend on the label and, since risk aversion gives rise to
 a particular functional form, the convention seems to be that whenever the
 functional form is observed or assumed we simply label it as characterizing a
 risk-averse individual or organization. In a letter following the conference,
 Professor Varian made essentially that point: "risk aversion can... be thought
 of as a reduced form of a more detailed model."10
 It might well be, therefore, that our quarrel is merely semantic. I suspect not.
 With this interpretation, all the intuitive appeals to risk aversion vanish. There
 is no reason to believe that the relevant functions are linked in any way with
 the underlying preferences toward risk. People who really are risk averse can
 act as if they are risk neutral in some contexts and risk loving in others.
 Underlying risk preferences can be overwhelmed by context.
 And that is my point. The focus ought to be on the context - the sort of
 problems featured in the new institutional economics. The underlying risk
 preferences should simply be ignored so that we may highlight what I believe
 to be the more significant determinants of institutional structure. This conclu-
 sion is not a logical inevitability. It reflects the experience of those of us out
 there in the trenches who have found risk preferences generally unhelpful in our
 efforts.
 The initial motivation for this conference was to bring together two groups
 studying economic institutions in quite different ways - the formal theorists on
 the one hand and a looser group of informal theorists and empiricists on the
 other. I recognize that the formal theorist's research agenda is driven in large
 part by an internal aesthetic that need have little contact with the "real world."
 Nonetheless, I do believe that explaining the stylized facts is a significant piece
 of that agenda. It certainly was at the core of Professor Varian's conference
 paper. My hope is that our efforts can provide the theorist with a better set of
 stylized facts and a strategy for coping with them (one piece of which is the
 notion that risk attitudes should be invoked only as a last resort). I don't know
 whether the altered research agenda envisioned can meet the aesthetic stan-
 dards of the current one. I hope it can, because we can use all the help we can
 get.
 10 In the context of his tax farming example, he noted that "the rulers may have a very
 high preference for cash in certain states of nature in order to pay their army, or to satisfy
 other sorts of contractual obligations." (Personal letter dated June 7, 1989.)
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